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Twenty years ago Christopher Lasch warned that sports were suffer-
ing from a decreased emphasis on human cooperation and interdepen-
dence.' In his 1979 book, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in
an Age of Diminishing Expectations, Lasch reported a tendency for play-
ers "to advance their interests not merely against rival organizations but
against their own teammates."2 He complained, "[t]he team player, like
the organization man, has become an anachronism."3 David Halber-
stain, traveling with the Portland Trailblazers basketball team, soon
thereafter observed the same tendency. He wrote, "[i]t was now an arti-
cle of faith among thoughtful former players that the new breed were by
far more talented, but that they lacked desperately one key element - a
feeling for each other, a sense of community... ."I Those closest to the
situation, the team's coaches, Halberstam reports, were convinced that
an excessive concern with "[m]oney now clouded not only the relation-
ships between management and player, but between player and player."'
Today, concern in this regard has, if anything, intensified. A New
York Times front page story during the 1998 National Basketball Associ-
ation (NBA) All Star Game weekend reported that many coaches, play-
ers, and team officials were talking among themselves about the decline
in "the nuts and bolts skills of the players as well as the ability to create
the sublime choreography of teamwork .. ..*"I This same article re-
ported that over the ten year period since the 1988/89 season, assists per
game, passes which lead to a score and therefore are an important indi-
cator of team play, fell from 51.2 to 43.6 per game.7 The article also
quotes Larry Brown, the coach of the Philadelphia 76ers, rhetorically
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asking: "[w]hy play a team sport and not help your teammates?"8 Even
Michael Jordan acknowledged the problem by indicating that he himself
might have been partially responsible for it.9 Jordan is cited as saying, "I
guess some of this crept in because of myself and Charles Barkley. With
our ability to take over a game and sell ourselves as individuals, we have
infected the game as much as we've helped it."'10
The widespread agreement that exists within the world of sports con-
cerning the decline of team play, particularly in the NBA, suggests that it
may well be true that contemporary athletes are more individualistic
than such athletes in the past. Lasch may have overstated the case when
he asserted that "the athlete as a professional entertainer seeks above all
to further his own interests and willingly sells his services to the highest
bidder."" Nevertheless, there does seem to be sufficient evidence of in-
creased individualism to warrant not only an exploration into the sources
of this problem but also a discussion of what can be done to correct it.
In team sports, where the work of the ensemble determines the excel-
lence of performance, rampant individualism is dangerously subversive.
Such individualism, and the resulting loss of team cooperation, may cor-
rode the quality of play and thereby threaten current popular sports such
as professional basketball.
The consensus view among commentators, and the one considered in
this paper, is that the compensation system employed in professional
sports is a source of this damaging individualism. Adam Bryant writes,
[m]ost everyone agrees that the current system for paying pro
athletes is out of line. It's not so much what athletes are paid ....
It's how. Players often get millions in long-term contracts that are
guaranteed regardless of whether they win or lose or put out real
effort. Outsized pay for superstars can.., make teamwork diffi-
cult to foster.12
In economic theory, the demand for workers by an employer is deter-
mined by the amount of additional revenue that the hiring of an em-
ployee will bring to the firm, the worker's marginal revenue product.
While employers will not pay a wage which exceeds the worker's margi-
nal revenue product, workers will not agree to a wage lower than they
can obtain elsewhere. Employers will endeavor to induce laborers to
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additional profits, and workers will seek to earn incomes as high as pos-
sible and certainly in excess of their opportunity costs. Thus, actual
wages typically will fall between the marginal revenue product at the
high end and the wage offered in alternative work at the low end.
Where in that range the wage actually paid to the workers falls, depends
upon the relative bargaining strength of each side in negotiations.
Through much of the history of professional sports, the market for
players was heavily weighted on the side of management. That is, wages
were substantially below the marginal revenue product.' 3 This was be-
cause the standard labor contract negotiated between the team and its
players contained a "reserve clause."' 4 This provision barred athletes
from playing on any team except the team which owned his contracts. In
this way, individual teams became monopsonists, the sole potential
buyer of an individual player's services. 5 Because it denied employees
the option of seeking alternative employment within the sports industry,
it biased the terms of the negotiations towards management.
In basketball, the monopsonistic power associated with the reserve
clause was first undermined by the emergence of a league in competition
with the long-established NBA.1 6 The new league, the American Bas-
ketball Association (ABA), played its first games in 1967.17 Its appear-
ance created a competitive market in which teams from each league
attempted to attract players. The competition for players resulted in the
bidding up of wages in the direction of the revenue product and away
from the level which athletes would earn at a job outside of the sport.'"
As James Quirk and Rodney D. Fort write, "[b]asketball players were
thus the first of the pro team sports athletes to see salary levels
skyrocketing."'19
When the two leagues initiated merger talks in the early 1970s, the
player's union, the NBA Players Association (NBAPA), filed a suit ask-
ing that the two leagues be barred from merging based on antitrust
grounds.2" Ultimately, this case was resolved in February 1976 in an out-
of-court settlement which eliminated the NBA's version of the reserve
13. See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRucruRE OF SPORS 43 (1995).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 31.
16. See JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BusINEss OF PROFESSIONAL
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clause.2 In the aftermath of that settlement, a merger of the two
leagues occurred.22 The players' interests were further advanced in 1980
with the ending of the system that entitled a club to compensation when
a player exercised his "free agency" to join another team.' The market
for players, however, was not totally free. Each team's payroll was sub-
ject to a limit or a salary cap which could be exceeded "only under re-
strictive conditions."24
The elimination of the reserve clause system and the creation of a
partially free labor market occurred at precisely the moment when it
would do the most good for the players, during a period of growing pop-
ularity for professional basketball. The players were able to bargain
their wages up in the direction of the marginal revenue product which, in
turn, was increasing because of both growing attendancezs and increas-
ing revenue from television.26 Attendance at NBA games during both
the 1972/73 and 1973/74 seasons stood at about 5.9 million.27 Soon
thereafter, however, attendance sky-rocketed reaching about ten million
during the 1981/82 season and about seventeen million during the 1990/
91 season.28 Even more dramatic was the increase in the revenue re-
ceived by the league from radio and television. As late as 1981/82, the
NBA was earning $18.5 million from its network contract with CBS.29 In
1989/90, however, it signed a contract with NBC for $150 million."
When combined with its local and cable contracts, revenue from televi-
sion and radio came to over $300 million. 31
In this environment of modified free agency and growing popularity,
player salaries grew dramatically. In constant 1991 dollars, average sala-
ries exceeded one hundred thousand dollars for the first time in 1970,
and went to about three hundred thousand in 1972.32 Throughout the
remainder of the 1970s, however, NBA salaries tended to plateau.3 But
with the salary cap accord and the increased popularity of the sport,
21. See QuIm & FoRT, supra note 16, at 204.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 205.
25. See id. at 500.
26. See QuIRK & FORT, supra note 16, at 511.
27. See id. at 500.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 511.
30. See id.
31. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 16, at 511.




player compensation experienced a dramatic growth, a trend which has
not yet reversed itself. By the early 1990s, the mean salary for an NBA
player exceeded $1 million. 4 For the 1997/98 season, the mean salary in
the league, uncorrected for inflation, stood at $2.23 million.35
Economic theory, thus, provides a useful framework within which to
explain the growth in player compensation. Nevertheless, there are as-
pects of its use which raise troubling questions. It is obvious, for exam-
ple, that no one is able to directly measure a player's marginal revenue
product. To do that it would be necessary, in the words of George Stein-
brenner, the owner of the New York Yankees, to know "how many fan-
nies he puts in the seats,"36 and no one can do that. Thus, in both salary
determination in the market and in economic analysis, a proxy must be
used to approximate the marginal revenue product. In this case, the
choice of the proxy follows from the fact that team revenues and victo-
ries are highly correlated. A player who plays well and in that way
contributes to his team's success in winning, is assumed to have a higher
marginal revenue product than a player who does not perform well.
On the assumption, therefore, that compensation is positively associ-
ated with the marginal revenue product, which in turn is positively asso-
ciated with performance indicators, Gerald W. Scully hypothesizes that,
in basketball, salaries should be related to an individual's points scored,
rebounds and assists.3" In fact, however, Scully's analysis reveals that a
statistically significant relationship exists only between compensation
and points scored, not the other two indicators of basketball prowess.39
The fact that points scored is the sole predictor of salary, however,
raises serious problems. Indeed, it calls into question the validity of us-
ing compensation as a proxy for the marginal revenue product. This is
because the relationship between points scored by an individual player
and that player's contribution to victory is not without ambiguity. At the
most fundamental level, if a player scores many points, but is a defensive
liability, he may, on balance, have contributed to his team's failure, not
success. The same would be true if that same high scoring player fails to
pass or rebound well. In these cases, the use of points scored as a mea-
sure of the player's marginal revenue product would result in an over-
estimate. Similarly, a player, who by the example of his effort sets a
34. See id.
35. See id.; see also NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS AssOCIATION, REOPENER 9 (1998).
36. QUiK & FORT, supra note 16, at 216.
37. See SCULLY, supra note 13, at 50.
38. See id. at 51.
39. See id. at 54-55.
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standard for his teammates, may in fact have made an important contri-
bution to the team's success. However, because the player's contribu-
tions may not show up as points scored, the estimate of his marginal
revenue product would tend to be too low.
Scully, in fact, recognizes these possibilities when he writes that pro-
ductivity, contributing to victory in sports, is easily measured "unless
there are important complementarities of inputs, as in football ....
Scully, however, does not believe that such complementarities are of im-
portance in estimating the marginal revenue product of players in bas-
ketball.4 ' In this, he believes that basketball is more like baseball than
football.42 Scully thinks that, like baseball, "the production function [in
basketball] is additively separable.., and the player contribution to club
performance is readily measured." 43
In baseball, it seems clear that the team's success is fundamentally
the result of the summation of the appropriately weighted individual
player accomplishments. Team play in baseball is of relatively minor im-
portance. In football, however, just the opposite is the case. The per-
formance of any one individual is essentially inseparable from the
performance of all of the others. This is especially true of the highest
paid players on the team, the quarterbacks, running backs and pass re-
ceivers. Passing and running require successful blocking and receiving
necessitates both blocking and a quarterback who can throw accurately.
Team performance is the outcome, not simply of the individual efforts,
but is affected by the interaction of the inputs. As a result, the high
salaries paid to the marquee players in football probably represent an
over-estimate of their individual contributions.
To gain insight into the extent of complementarity in basketball, we
examine the relationship between the compensation paid to the five
highest paid players on each NBA team and the success of the team as
measured by the victories it achieved during the 1996-97 season.
40. Id. at 60.
41. See id. at 50.





COMPENSATION AND VICTORIES OF HIGH PAYING
NBA TEAMS
Successful High Paying Teams Unsuccessful High Pavina Teams
Top Five Top Five
Compensation Compensation
Team $millions Wins Team $millions Wins
Chicago 49.7 69 Orlando 33.1 45
LA Lakers 23.8 56 Indiana 30.0 39
Houston 23.0 57 Washington 28.1 44
Atlanta 22.7 56 Phoenix 25.8 40
Seattle 22.6 57 San Anton. 22.9 20
Detroit 20.0 54 Golden St 19.4 30
New York 18.2 57 Portland 17.4 49
Miami 18.1 61 Phila. 17.0 22
Utah 17.9 64





COMPENSATION AND VICroRIES OF Low PAYING
NBA TEAMS
Successful Low Paying Teams Unsuccessful Low Paying Teams
Top Five Top Five
Compensation Compensation
Team $millions Wins Team $millions Wins




New Jersey 16.2 26
Denver 14.6 21
Minn. 14.4 40




Average 14.9 54 Average 14.5 28.6
If basketball is like baseball, we should find that the teams with the
highest payrolls were the most successful clubs, and that teams with low
payrolls were less successful. The absence of such a pattern would sug-
gest the importance of non-compensated complementarities in achieving
success in the sport. The decision to confine the analysis to the top five
44. See 1996-97 NBA Player Salaries, SALT LAKE Tnm., Nov. 15, 1996, at D6; 1997-98
GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS MEDIA GUIDE 240 (1997).
45. See id-
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players on each team was made because these are the individuals who,
by virtue of their high salaries, are presumed to make the greatest contri-
bution to team victories (and therefore revenues). Further, in light of
the likelihood that the NBA salary cap most seriously compresses the
compensation of the least well-paid players, the market probably is more
acute in discriminating among the performance accomplishments of the
highly paid players compared to the rest of the league players.
What our data reveals is that a high level of compensation is no guar-
antee of success for a team in the NBA, but that parsimony, in that re-
gard, all but ensures failure.46 Seventeen teams had payrolls of at least
$17 million for their five highest paid players; nine of them with an aver-
age payroll of about $24 million had successful seasons with a mean total
victory count of fifty-nine and eight with a payroll slightly in excess of
$24 million had unsuccessful seasons averaging thirty-six wins among
them.47 Indeed, skepticism with regard to the efficacy of compensation
is enhanced if the anomalous case of the Chicago Bulls is omitted.
(Michael Jordan plays on that team and was paid $30.1 million, by far
the highest of any player in the history of the game).48 With the Bulls
excluded, the successful teams' mean payroll was reduced to a level
lower than that of the unsuccessful highly paid teams.49 But with the
exclusion of the Bulls, the mean victory count for the successful teams
fell by only one game, leaving them with almost twenty-two more victo-
ries on average than the unsuccessful teams.5 0 At the same time, how-
ever, it is also clear that compensation is not irrelevant to success. Only
one team of the twelve with a top player payroll under $17 million had a
successful season.5' This pattern is still strong if the exceptional cases of
Toronto and Vancouver are excluded - they were first season expansion
teams in 1996-97.
These patterns suggest that Scully may have been in error in thinking
that "the production function" in basketball was more similar to that in
baseball than football.52 The fact that team success cannot be predicted
from the summation of individual compensations suggests the presence
46. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
47. See 1996-97 NBA Player Salaries, supra note 44, at D6.
48. See id.
49. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
50. See supra Tables 1 and 2, 1997-98 GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS MEDIA GUIDE, supra
note 44, at 240.
51. See supra Tables 1 and 2; 1997-98 GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS MEDIA GUIDE, supra
note 44, at 240.
52. See SCULLY, supra note 13, at 50.
[Vol. 9:91
TEAM PLAY
of important complementarities. It is because those complementarities
are not systematically taken into account in a market in which points
scored is the most important determinant of player salaries, that the
summation of player compensation is not a good predictor of team
performance.
Nevertheless, player compensation is not irrelevant to team accom-
plishment in basketball. There was only one team, Orlando, which
achieved fifty or more victories with a payroll of under $17.9 million.53
Aside from this exception, only one of these teams won as many as half
of its games, with the average number of wins for low-paid, poorly-per-
forming teams at only about twenty-nine.54 Thus, what is present in bas-
ketball is a situation in which individual achievement, as measured by
player compensation, may be a necessary condition for team success, but
it is not sufficient to ensure that success.
But what all of this indicates is that an important element in team
success is left unmotivated by the compensation system. For compensa-
tion not only reflects productivity, the promise of rewards motivates be-
havior as well. If points scored per game is the single best predictor of
compensation, then it is likely that players will attempt to become higher
scorers as a means of maximizing their income. It similarly follows that
if team play - the complementarity of inputs - is left unrewarded, most
players will find no compelling reason to emphasize this aspect of their
repertoire. Thus, the compensation system reflects not merely one as-
pect of player productivity, but in its turn it helps to shape the way the
game is played.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that the wide-spread observa-
tion that the drift towards individualistic rather than team play in basket-
ball may be rooted in the sport's compensation system. Especially
because the sport's popularity and the existence of at least a degree of
free agency has dramatically raised the stakes involved, a plausible case
can be made that what the players are doing is simply responding to the
reward system with which they are faced. It similarly follows that a
change in the pattern of play will require a shift in the incentives which
are offered to the players. A more collective approach to the play of the
game will require a more collective compensation system.
53. See 1996-97 NBA Player Salaries, supra note 44, at D6; 1997-98 GOLDEN STATE WAR-
RIORS MEDIA GUiDE, supra note 44, at 240.
54. See 1996-97 NBA Player Salaries, supra note 44, at D6; 1997-98 GOLDEN STATE WAR-
RIORS MEDIA GumE, supra note 44, at 240.
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Such a compensation system, one whose impact is to encourage co-
operative and team play, already exists, albeit only in a miniaturized
form. That system is the NBA Playoff Pool. With it, money is awarded
to teams for specifically defined collective achievements. Those achieve-
ments and their awards are listed in Table 3. They include allocations to
encourage success in the regular season as well as achievements during
the playoffs themselves. How the awards are distributed to team mem-
bers is determined by the players themselves. Typically, equal player
shares of the award are allocated to full-season team members, with indi-
viduals who were on the roster for only a part of the season receiving
proportionately reduced shares. The Playoff Pool, thus, acts to en-
courage collective accomplishment and to the extent that it does so, pro-
vides a counter-weight to the tendency to individualism latent in the
player contract system. It is obvious, however, that the size of the pool is
entirely too small to offset individualism in the NBA. It is possible to
obtain a sense of the relative power of each by examining the collective
awards earned by a representative successful team during the 1996/97
season, the Houston Rockets. The Rockets finished the season in sec-
ond place in the Midwest Division of the Western Conference. They
won the first round playoff series against Minnesota and were also victo-
rious in their Conference semi-finals against favored Seattle. It was only
when the Rockets advanced to the Conference finals that they were de-
feated. In moving to that level, the Rockets ranked among the top four
teams in the NBA, a collective success by any standard.
TABLE 355
1997 NBA PLAYOFF POOL
Best Record in NBA 224,000
Best Record in Conference: $196,000 each 392,000
Second Best Record in Conference: $157,500 each 315,000
Third Best Record in Conference: $117,500 235,000
Fourth Best Record in Conference: $92,500 185,000
Fifth Best Record in Conference: $77,000 154,000
Sixth Best Record in Conference: $52,500 105,000
Teams Participating in First Round: $101,500 1,624,000
Teams Participating in Conference Semifinals: $120,750 966,000
Teams Participating in Conference Finals: $199,500 798,000
Winning Team, NBA Finals: 1,204,000
Losing Team NBA Finals: 798,000
Total Playoff Pool 7,000,000




PLAYOFF POOL EARNED BY HOUSTON ROCKETS, 1996-97
Achievement Total Award Per Player Award
Second Best Record in Conference $157,000 $13,125
Participating in First Round $101,500 $ 8,458
Participating in Conference Semifinals $120,750 $10,063
Participating in Conference Finals $199,500 $16,625
Total $579,250 $48,271
To keep the analysis straightforward, it is assumed that each award
was shared equally by twelve roster players. In fact, there were addi-
tional smaller awards which meant that each of the full shares in fact
were slightly smaller than those presented in the table. Using this as-
sumption, each of the team members of the Houston Rockets earned
about fifty thousand dollars from the team's collective accomplishment.
Obviously, this is not a trivial amount of money by the standard of the
typical wage earner in the United States. However, the extent to which
it acts as an incentive to team play as opposed to individualistic play in
the NBA is suggested when it is put alongside the compensation paid to
the athletes on the team. Doing so makes it clear that collective rewards
pale in significance when compared to the rewards for individual accom-
plishment. In a year in which Houston's Hakeem Olajuwon earned
$9.65 million, Clyde Drexler $5.5 million, Charles Barkley $4.695 mil-
lion, Brent Price $1.6 million and Kevin Willis $1.5 million, it is doubtful
that the amount available for each player in the playoff pool acted very
powerfully to motivate team play.57 The same is true for the team which
earned the highest rewards from the playoff pool, the Chicago Bulls. Per
player, the Bulls earned $170,474.00 from that pool. But placed in com-
parison to the $30.14 million earned by Michael Jordan, the $9 million
earned by Dennis Rodman, the $3.96 million earned by Toni Kukoc, the
$3.84 earned by Ron Harper, and the $2.79 million earned by Luc Long-
ley, all of whom played for Chicago, it is very unlikely that the prospects
of playoff pool earnings figured urgently in the considerations of these
players.58 In a league in which sixteen players earned an annual income
in 1996-97 equal to the entire playoff pool to be distributed to all of the
clubs combined ($7 million) and the summation of the annual salaries
paid to the top five players on each team was $583.8 million, it seems
quite likely that players fantasize more about how much they can earn
56. Computed from data in Table 3.
57. See 1996-97 NBA Player Salaries, supra note 44, at D6.
58. See id.
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by scoring points than they do about the rewards available for team
success.
59
Given the magnitudes involved, it is clear that it would take a funda-
mental change in the structure of earnings to move the incentives for
team accomplishment anywhere near to parity with those of individualis-
tic achievement. To be successful in motivating team play, the playoff
pool would have to grow massively relative to individual compensation.
Doing so would elevate the importance of collective compared to indi-
vidual achievement and thereby create conditions conducive to a resur-
gence of team and cooperative play. The fact, however, that neither the
NBA nor the players' union have raised the subject for discussion in col-
lective bargaining, suggests that such a reallocation is not going to occur
any time soon. It remains to be seen what the owners will attempt to
accomplish having recently opened the collective bargaining agreement
for renegotiation. But there are no reports that they have in mind any-
thing so dramatic as changing the structure of incentives under which the
players presently perform. Similarly, though the players' union has ex-
pressed concern about the increasing inequality of income which has re-
cently evidenced itself, there is no sign that the NBAPA is moving in the
direction of a more collective compensation system than presently exists.
The fact remains that all is not well.with professional basketball. The
league's commissioner, David Stern, has suggested that almost half of
the teams are failing to earn a profit. 60 Furthermore, neither overall fan
attendance as a percentage of capacity nor television ratings have in-
creased during this season. Rather, the fact is that it looks very much as
if the growth curve is decelerating. If this continues, it may be that at
some time in the future, in order to correct the tendency towards stagna-
tion, the league and its players may turn to the quality of play as an issue
to be examined. In doing so they will find, that indeed, the anecdotal
evidence is correct, that the sport is characterized by too much individu-
alism and not enough team play, and that this pattern is at least in part a
response to the structure of incentives present in the current system of
compensation. Despite the fact that a reconsideration of the structure of
incentives in compensation is not on the current agenda, a reform of how
players in the NBA are paid may yet receive serious attention. If so,
basketball may return to its aesthetically most satisfying roots of cooper-
ation and team play.
59. See id.
60. See David Stern and Russ Granik Press Conference Mar. 23, 1998, (visited Oct. 26,
1998) <http://vww.nba.com>, at 2.
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